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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DEPRIVING AMERICA OF EVOLVING ITS OWN STANDARDS OF
DECENCY?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN
EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON
DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court is no stranger to public scrutiny. Decisions regarding
hot-button social issues, such as the validity of school prayer and the presence
of religious monuments on government property, have been widely discussed
in the political realm because of differing opinions as to how the Establishment
Clause1 should be interpreted.2 Similarly, abortion, gay rights, and affirmative
action are all specific issues upon which the Court’s constitutional
interpretations have received (and will continue to receive) significant public
scrutiny. In 2005, the Court addressed another controversial topic in Roper v.
Simmons3—the death penalty.
Typically, public responses to the Court’s decisions regarding the death
penalty and other divisive issues have focused on the substance and outcome
of these cases. The general population tends to focus on the legal result of the
cases rather than on the Court’s reasoning and methodology. However, after
the Court’s decision in Roper, the public showed an increased interest in one
particular aspect of the Court’s process and methodology: the citation and
influence of foreign law in interpreting the Constitution.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
2. A number of recent Supreme Court cases have garnered particular attention in these and
other areas. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (upholding an injunction
barring displays of the Ten Commandments outside Kentucky courthouses due to their religious
purposes); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the inscription of the Ten
Commandments on a monument at the Texas State Capital did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the juvenile death penalty is
unconstitutional; discussed infra Part II.C.); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding
that a Texas statute banning homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional due to the “emerging
awareness” in society that liberty demands that adults be allowed to make personal decisions
about their private sexual conduct); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded; discussed infra Part II.B.).
3. 543 U.S. 551.
855
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The Supreme Court recently decided a number of cases which have
discussed and cited foreign legal sources as authority for the majority opinion.4
The citation of foreign law in these cases has led to a firestorm of debate and
criticism about the role of these sources in constitutional law.5 In fact, Justices
Scalia and Breyer recently met at American University for a public discussion
of the relevance of foreign law in the Court’s decisions.6 More recently, the
citation of foreign legal sources in constitutional decisions was a partial focus
in the confirmation hearings of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.7
4. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21.
5. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Op-Ed., Innocence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A25
(discussing the controversy over the use of foreign law and opposing Chief Justice Roberts’s
criticism of its use on the Court); Hadar Harris, “We Are the World”—Or Are We? The United
States’ Conflicting Views on the Use of International Law and Foreign Legal Decisions, HUM.
RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2005, at 5 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law is highly
beneficial to furthering human rights in U.S. policy); Frank James, Gonzales Raps Justices for
Citing Foreign Laws, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2005, at 13 (discussing a speech by Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales explaining his opposition to the Supreme Court’s reliance on foreign law in
recent cases); Felix G. Rohatyn, Op-Ed., Dead to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23
(criticizing Justice Alito’s opposition to incorporating foreign law into the Court’s decisions);
Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (exploring Justice Kennedy’s
reasoning for invoking foreign sources).
6. Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign
Court Decisions, Discussion at American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/ founders/2005/050113.cfm (scroll down for link
to transcript).
7. During his confirmation hearings, Justice Alito discussed his opposition to the use of
foreign sources in domestic Constitutional decisions:
I don’t think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own Constitution. I
agree . . . that the laws of the United States consist of the Constitution and treaties and
laws, and I would add regulations that are promulgated in accordance with law. And I
don’t think that it’s appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in interpreting the
provisions of our Constitution. I think the Framers would be stunned by the idea that the
Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the countries of the world.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
471 (2006) (testimony of Samuel A. Alito, nominee for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court).
Chief Justice Roberts relayed similar sentiments at his confirmation hearing:
[R]elying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discretion the
way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can confine and shape the
discretion of the judges.
In foreign law you can find anything you want. If you don’t find it in the decisions
of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever. As
somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking out
over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them, they’re there. . . . It allows
the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the
authority of precedent because they’re finding precedent in foreign law, and use that to
determine the meaning of the Constitution. I think that’s a misuse of precedent, not a
correct use of precedent.
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Irrespective of the political overtones of much of the mainstream
commentary on the use of foreign legal sources, there remains an important
ongoing discussion about this practice in the legal field.8 The scholarly
discussion focuses on the methodology and theory underlying judicial
decision-making.9 Ultimately, the debate turns on whether foreign law has any
bearing on the meaning of the United States Constitution, and whether its use
has a detrimental effect on constitutional law and the integrity of the Court.
One area where the use of foreign law has been particularly apparent is in
recent Eighth Amendment cases, such as Roper v. Simmons10 and Atkins v.
Virginia.11 This Comment argues that citing foreign law as authority for
interpreting the Eighth Amendment12 undermines the American democratic
process by curtailing the ability of American citizens to engage in a full
discussion on the death penalty.13 As a result, the public itself is deprived of
its function as a democratic unit that can shape and develop American law.
It should be recognized at the outset that democratic discourse is limited to
some extent any time the Court announces a rule of constitutional law.14
However, the pre-emption of an issue in public discourse is different under
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because the Supreme Court follows a
standard whereby the Court looks to “the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society” as the measuring stick for what

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 201 (2005) (testimony of
John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice of the United States).
8. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303
(2006) (arguing that foreign law should not be cited as authority in American constitutional
decisions); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Judge, 9th Cir. Ct. App., What Role Should Foreign
Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, Speech at the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London (Oct. 11, 2004), in 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1893 (2005) (suggesting that judges should recognize the usefulness of foreign law but
noting that they should take a cautious approach when citing to it); Richard A. Posner, Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 84–90 (2005) (suggesting that citation to foreign law is
a shield for interjecting political judgments into the Court’s opinions).
9. See supra note 8.
10. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
11. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
13. Most criticism of the use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment cases seems to come from
individuals who are also politically and morally sympathetic to the death penalty. Insofar as this
author personally finds the imposition of the death penalty morally repugnant, this Comment
differs from many others. This Comment does not attack the nature of the results produced by
the Court’s decision, but rather the flawed methodology that achieved those results.
14. See WILLIAM J. QUIRK & R. RANDALL BRIDWELL, JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP 8 (1995)
(discussing Alexander Bickel’s view that “[t]he Court’s decision necessarily cuts off public
debate and the possibility of achieving a democratic consensus.”).
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constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment.15 Because this standard takes into
account society’s notion of civilized punishment, it requires the Court to
consider the state of democratic progress on that issue.16 The standard itself
requires a determination of the state of the ongoing discussion in the public
sphere, as portrayed by the American people through their state legislatures.
Therefore, the Court’s methodology under the Eighth Amendment deserves
particularly close attention to ensure that the process of judicial action does not
inadvertently damage democratic ideals.
Part I begins with an explanation of democratic discourse as a
“marketplace of ideas,” which is integral to the democratic republic. The
nature and workings of a functioning democracy are further considered in light
of Jürgen Habermas’s work on the subject. The role of the judiciary is
considered in light of the nature of democracy and the intent of the Framers.
Part II identifies and explains constitutional decisions that have developed
the standard for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, primarily Trop v. Dulles,17
Atkins v. Virginia,18 and Roper v. Simmons.19 The Court’s opinions in these
cases elucidate the debate on the appropriate role of foreign law in interpreting
the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, Part III presents a discussion of the role of democracy in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and the effect of foreign law on American society.
First, the Court’s growing use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment decisions
is examined in order to determine the magnitude of foreign law’s current
effect. Second, this Comment explains that the use of foreign law has a direct
impact on democracy in that it prevents Americans from engaging in a full and
thorough examination of what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.”20
This is largely because the importance of maintaining the democratic and truthrevealing nature of the socio-political sphere in the United States is
circumvented when these sources are used. This Comment also considers
potential responses by the three branches of government and the public and
suggests which efforts can most effectively eliminate the use of foreign law in
the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.

15. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
16. See id. at 99–100.
17. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
18. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
19. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
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I. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
There is a justified concern that the Court’s use of foreign law as authority
will negatively impact American democracy. Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit expressed this concern, noting that international opinion is
unrelated to our democratic institutions and has no rightful place in our
jurisprudence:
Judges in foreign countries do not have the slightest democratic legitimacy in a
U.S. context. The votes of foreign electorates, the judicial confirmation
procedures (if any) in foreign nations, are not events in our democracy. To cite
foreign decisions in order to establish an international consensus that should
have weight with U.S. courts is like subjecting legislation enacted by Congress
21
to review by the United Nations General Assembly.

In order to appreciate the current and future impact that the use of foreign law
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can have on basic democratic principles,
it is important to understand the underpinnings of democratic theory. As
discussed below, one of the more recent articulations of this theory comes not
from American tradition, but rather from the writings of Jürgen Habermas.
Though Habermas is German, his ideas about democracy are not foreign to
American political or judicial tradition. The following discussion provides an
overview of this tradition, including a basic explanation of democratic theory
from the viewpoints of many thinkers, culminating with Habermas’s position.
These principles explicate the interplay between democratic ideals, the Eighth
Amendment, and the role of the judiciary.
A.

Democracy and the “Marketplace of Ideas”

The term “marketplace of ideas” has been used for centuries as a
mechanism for explaining the manner in which a free and democratic society is
able to arrive at truth. Essentially, when citizens exercise speech rights, as
under the First Amendment,22 society as a whole is able to gradually develop a
truthful conception of any issue.23 The free exchange of ideas in the public
sphere allows the citizenry to engage in an evolving discussion of principles
until ultimately a unity of theory develops in such a way that the public at large
can generally—if not unanimously—agree upon a course of action or policy.24

21. Posner, supra note 8, at 88–89.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
23. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . .”).
24. See id.
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This is often the case with the development of moral values and social change
within a community, whether at the local or national level.25
Indeed, the Framers thought this principle of idea-exchange important
enough that the United States Constitution guarantees a republican form of
government to the states26 and preserves the citizens’ right to freedom of
speech.27 The interplay is apparent: preservation of public speech is necessary
to ensuring a republican form of government where citizens are able to voice
their opinions to elected policy makers.28 Without this discourse, a republican
form of government would lack the character of a democracy altogether.29
Thus, the exchange of ideas in the “free market” is essential to the basic
foundation of American constitutional law.
John Locke30 thought it natural for political societies to form through the
consent of individuals to be governed by the will of the majority.31 The
function of this political society, under Locke’s theory, was to “unite for the
mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates,” or in other words, to
promote the common good.32 Although Locke did not propose a strictly

25. As noted by Jürgen Habermas, collective action against modern social problems—
including women’s rights, immigration, and poverty in the Third World—typically begins in the
public sphere:
Hardly any of these topics were initially brought up by exponents of the state apparatus,
large organizations, or functional systems. Instead, they were broached by intellectuals,
concerned citizens, radical professionals, self-proclaimed “advocates,” and the like.
Moving in from this outermost periphery, such issues force their way into newspapers and
interested associations, clubs, professional organizations, academies, and universities.
They find forums, citizen initiatives, and other platforms before they catalyze the growth
of social movements and new subcultures.
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 381 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46–47 (James Madison) (Bantam ed. 1982) (explaining
that in a republic, the public chooses representatives to whom the public views may be
communicated).
29. See id. (noting the similarities and differences between a pure democracy and a
republic).
30. John Locke (1632–1704) was an English political theorist and philosopher. Peter
Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 3, 16 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
31. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330–33 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
32. Id. at 350 (emphasis in original).
For being now in a new State, wherein he is to enjoy many Conveniences, from the
labour, assistance, and society of others in the same Community, as well as protection
from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty in providing
for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the Society shall require. . . .
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democratic form of political life, at least some of the Founders of our nation,
such as Thomas Jefferson, were clearly influenced by Locke and recognized
that the will of the majority was an integral component of a democratic
society.33
However, there remained a fear that the majority could turn tyrannous and
bend the people to its will.34 Noting that there will always be factions in
democratic governance that seek to impose their will on the populace, James
Madison wrote:
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can
such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and
remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of
35
the whole.

Thus, the Federalists promoted the notion of a republican form of government
instead of a pure democracy in order to ensure that the people would enjoy
democratic decision-making power, while also guarding against the tyranny of
the majority.36 According to Madison, the effect of a republic is to “refine and
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country.”37
Essentially, the Founders aimed to create a democratic republic wherein
the citizens would be able to discuss policies and issues and collectively
determine the best course of action.38 Recognizing the potential for
manipulation and abuse by a majority of self-interested citizens, Madison and
the Federalists proposed a system of government wherein representatives
would be seated to determine the course of the discussion among their
constituents and speak on their behalf.39 This view includes the notion of “the
Id. at 353.
33. See Laslett, supra note 30, at 15 (noting the “coincidence” between Locke’s work and
The Declaration of Independence, though suggesting that Locke’s influence on the Founders has
been overstated).
34. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 28.
35. Id. at 45.
36. See id. at 45–48 (describing the similarities and differences between a pure democracy
and republic).
37. Id. at 46–47.
38. See id. at 46–47 (describing the ability of the public to elect representatives to whom
their interests and concerns may be voiced for consideration in the governmental decision-making
process).
39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 28, at 46–47 (describing the
possibility of oppression in a pure democracy and how a democratic republic can improve that
process).
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marketplace of ideas,” wherein the citizens gather in the public sphere to
develop issues in order to come to a clearer understanding of the validity and
prudence of such matters.
The maintenance of this free market of ideas was further expounded upon
in the writings of the English philosopher John Stuart Mill,40 who explained
the necessity of ongoing discussion for the pursuit of truth and proper
governance: “We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to
stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”41
Mill argued that the opponents of an idea cannot morally justify muting
argument on a topic, because doing so essentially decides the question for
everyone.42
Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very
condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on
no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of
43
being right.

Thus, Mill argues that the majority can be tyrannical and states that free
discussion of ideas in the public sphere can only lead to human development if
it is not smothered by the powerful.44 Accordingly, dissenters should not be
quieted, but instead encouraged to raise their views, although unpopular, in
open debate with their opponents.45 The discussion remains vibrant in this
way, and the risk of majority error is rectifiable because in the face of social
error, an argument by those in dissent has the opportunity to advance and lead
toward truth.46
In America, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes echoed Mill’s sentiments in
his famous dissent from Abrams v. United States:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
47
wishes safely can be carried out.

Likewise, Justice Brandeis further expounded upon the truth-finding principle
of democracy in his concurrence for Whitney v. California:

40. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was an English philosopher and developer of
Utilitarianism. Elizabeth Rapaport, Introduction to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY vii, viii
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g 1978) (1859).
41. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g 1978)
(1859).
42. Id. at 16–17. “All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.” Id. at 17.
43. Id. at 18.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. MILL, supra note 41, at 18.
47. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. . . . They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. . . . Believing in the power of reason as applied through
public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of
48
force in its worst form.

An underlying ideal of democratic governance, which the judiciary must
protect, is that society at large must be allowed to engage in a discussion of
matters unfettered by the will of the powerful.
If ever a society is to arrive at actual truth, speech and participation in
social discourse must be encouraged and permitted the opportunity to flourish.
Dissenters ought not be silenced, because doing so creates the risk that actual
truth will be buried in self-righteous certainty. To be sure, majority rule is
necessary for effective governance; but in order for the nation to remain
successful in the implementation of responsible policy decisions, the majority
must not exert its will so as to quash the conversation at large.
B.

Habermas’s View of Democratic Functionality in the Public Sphere

Despite the use of democracy as a mechanism for truth, the problem exists
that deliberations in the public sphere are often curtailed by majority rule.49
Jürgen Habermas50 advanced an explanation for this phenomenon in his work
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.51 Although Habermas is
German, his critique of this truth-finding process is supported by history and is
in keeping with the American understanding of democracy. Essentially,
Habermas argues that when all persons who are capable of rational discussion
are invited into the public sphere, issues are widely examined by people of all
backgrounds and viewpoints, and the decision-making process grows as a
function of this participation.52 This relates to Habermas’s theory of

48. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
49. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
50. Jürgen Habermas (1929– ) is a German critical theorist and philosopher. Patrick Baert,
Jürgen Habermas, in PROFILES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 84–86 (Anthony Elliot &
Bryan S. Turner eds., 2001).
51. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991)
(1962).
52. See id. at 3–4.
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communicative action, whereby individuals in a society communicate verbally
to share and debate ideas, which will be either disregarded or institutionalized
into society depending on social agreement as to the rightness or wrongness of
those ideas.53 It is in this manner that a democratic society is able to pursue
truth in the public sphere, a necessity for efficient and effective government by
the people.
Habermas relates the success (and decline) of democratic systems through
history in an effort to explain how they function. Habermas’s historical
account notes that democracy as it existed in Ancient Greece has been the
general model for modern Western society.54 In the Hellenic democracy, free
citizens engaged directly with one another in the public sphere to better
achieve an understanding of truth in the community.55 There, topics and
conflicts became thematized56 as they were raised by the populace, and the
honorable practice of debate over issues ultimately resulted in the resolution of
such problems.57 Arguments continued to develop until an argument emerged
with such weight and clarity that its truth could not be denied:
Only in the light of the public sphere did that which existed become revealed,
did everything become visible to all. In the discussion among citizens issues
were made topical and took on shape. In the competition among equals the
58
best excelled and gained their essence—the immortality of fame.

According to Habermas, the public sphere was largely diminished under
feudalism, as the King and his administrators—as well as the Church—made
decisions on the people’s behalf.59 However, the emergence of capitalism over
time tended to re-open the public sphere due to the necessity of open
communication for the purpose of trade in the port cities.60 As industrial
societies developed more fully, the need for the exchange of information

53. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME 2—SYSTEM
LIFEWORLD: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 119–27 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
Beacon Press 1987); see Mathieu Deflem, Introduction: Law in Habermas’s Theory of
Communicative Action, in HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND LAW 1, 3–4 (Mathieu Deflem ed.,
1996).
54. HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 4. “Since the Renaissance this model of the Hellenic
public sphere, as handed down to us in the stylized form of Greek self-interpretation, has shared
with everything else considered ‘classical’ a peculiarly normative power. Not the social
formation at its base but the ideological template itself has preserved continuity over the
centuries—on the level of intellectual history.” Id.
55. Id.
56. The term “thematized” is used here to refer to the process of bringing issues and topics
into public discussion for analysis and examination.
57. HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7–10.
60. Id. at 14–18.
AND
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between individuals became more pronounced, further increasing the
participation of citizens in the public sphere.61
As the public sphere grew, the discourse naturally grew beyond matters of
trade and came to involve political issues, whereby the legal landscape
gradually came to sanction the public as a collective participant in the political
sphere.62 The continued development of social structures and political rights
ultimately allowed further growth of the public sphere so that discourse within
the socio-political environment acquired a real possibility of creating a
consensus upon which effective policy measures were taken.63
Habermas’s insight is that when discussion can continue unhindered in the
public sphere in a more or less transparent and uninterrupted manner, society
has the ability over time to develop that dialogue into a realization of truth or
something very close to it: “The public sphere of civil society stood or fell with
the principle of universal access. A public sphere from which specific groups
would be eo ipso excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public
sphere at all.”64 In other words, with broad participation and a variety of
viewpoints, it is more likely that an argument will develop that encompasses
all facets of social reality.65 Such an argument incorporates dynamic principles
of truth and justice, and therefore has great social import.66 In this author’s
estimation, it is because of this truth elucidation mechanism that representative
government is a viable political option. With an open dialogue in which all
citizens are capable of participating, the citizenry effectively elects those who
can best relay its collective policy determinations to the nation-state and
implement what, at least on a local level, becomes a consensus.
In order to truly reflect Habermasian theory, it should be noted that while
Habermas remains a strong believer in democracy, his view of the modern
world is not one of utopian naïveté. Habermas does not seem to believe that
the public sphere fully continues to operate in an open and democratic fashion
in the modern world.67 For Habermas, free and open discussion has been
replaced, at least to some extent, with mass media, which tends to dictate to the
public rather than to engage members of the community in a political
discussion.68 According to Habermas, political news is watered down, and the
public at large is distracted in the commercial media with sports and

61. Id. at 57–59.
62. See HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 83 (discussing the development of constitutional states
wherein certain rights became guaranteed, thereby ensuring the existence and vitality of the
public sphere as a quasi-political entity).
63. See id.
64. Id. at 85.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 159–75, 211–22.
68. Id. at 163–65, 168–69.
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entertainment.69 In essence, Habermas’s insight derives in part from the fact
that communication has become a business wherein parties generally purchase
a one-way dialogue, rarely engage in public discussion, and are bombarded
with advertisements.70 Instead of open discourse in the public sphere, political
debate occurs mainly among family and friends, where participants “have a
tendency to do no more than mutually confirm their ideas and at best to
influence only the hesitant and less involved parties.”71
As explained by Mathiu Deflem, Habermas’s theory is that money and
power steer at least some levels of democratic society, and interpersonal
democracy is incapable of driving social progress alone:
[Money and power] relieve communicative action from difficulties in reaching
consensus in complex societies characterized by a range of action alternatives
and, therefore, a constant threat of dissent. Actions coordinated by the steering
media of money and power differ from communicative action in that they aim
at the successful . . . organization of the production and exchange of goods on
the basis of monetary profit (economy) and the formation of government to
72
reach binding decisions in terms of bureaucratic efficiency (politics).

Law provides a basis for institutionalizing the roles of money and power by
providing legal norms that can be governmentally enforced, while democracy,
though it continues, operates among smaller subsets of society.73 Instead of a
purely democratic public sphere as a means for uncovering truths for
humankind, society is directed on the one hand toward personal subjective
understandings of morality and personal identity, and toward the efficiency of
government bureaucracies through agreed upon legal mandates on the other
hand.74
While Habermas’s analysis reveals troubling tendencies in modern
democratic functionality, he does not believe that rational public deliberation
has ceased altogether. Although modern political news seems to involve
consumptive qualities and is at times dictated to the public, there remains in
modern society the character of democratic deliberation.75 The democratic
69. Id. at 169–70.
70. Id. at 164, 175–77.
71. Id. at 213.
72. Deflem, supra note 53, at 4–5.
73. HABERMAS, supra note 53, at 164–79; see Deflem, supra note 53, at 5–6. Habermas
does not deny that values cannot be developed and shared by those with moral influence in the
community, but he does note that such action typically is not dominant in the modern public
sphere “where the influence of journalists, party leaders, intellectuals, artists, and the like is of
primary importance.” HABERMAS, supra note 53, at 275; see also id. at 264–82.
74. HABERMAS, supra note 53, at 164–79; see Deflem, supra note 53, at 6.
75. For instance, the public’s engagement of political and social issues continues to occur on
a regular basis via discussions in the workplace and schools, as well as through public
demonstrations in cities across the country. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA: 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT 3 (2004), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/about/aiusa_annualreport.pdf
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nature of American society suffers to the extent that public discussion and
engagement of the issues in open forums appears to be shrinking, but that
democratic nature of the republic persists nonetheless. What Habermas
describes is a taint on an efficient and robust democracy. But a tainted
democracy is not a rotten democracy. It would be a mistake to ignore other
factors contributing to a diminished public discourse simply because of this
trend. Habermas himself notes that “the players in the arena owe their
influence to the approval of those in the gallery.”76 As a result, the democratic
notions provided by Habermas are used in this Comment as a framework to
support the claim that the use of foreign law in current Eighth Amendment
decisions undermines the democratic nature of American political life.
C. The Role of the Judiciary
Unlike the Legislative and Executive Branches of government,
participation in the Judiciary is an attenuated function of democratic society.
Citizens have only minimal participation in the selection of federal judges,
insofar as judicial philosophy and methodology may play minor roles in
determining which presidential candidates receive votes.77 That is, knowing
that the executive will make determinations about what kind of judges will be
(explaining the national involvement of over 330,000 individuals and nearly 200,000 student
groups in its human rights activism and awareness programs); Michelle Boorstein, Protestors See
Mood Shift Against ‘Roe’, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2006, at A3 (reporting on an early-2006 pro-life
protest in Washington, D.C. attended by thousands); Darryl Fears & Krissah Williams, Immigrant
Rallies Have Mixed Impact, WASH. POST, May 7, 2006, at A3 (discussing opposition to illegal
immigration in response to large rallies in support of immigrants); Evelyn Nieves, Groups
Preparing New Push Against Iraq War; Invasion Anniversary Next Month is Date of Campaign
Kickoff, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2005, at A3 (discussing the growing protest activity of citizens
opposed to U.S. military activity in Iraq); Antonio Olivo & Oscar Avila, United They March:
Hundreds of Thousands Rally for Immigration Rights, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2006, at C1 (describing
collective action of protestors in Chicago and other U.S. cities in support of immigrant concerns);
Robert Pear, Rally Near White House Protests Violence in Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006,
at 22 (recounting a large protest in Washington, D.C. against American support for Israeli
military operations in Lebanon); Robin Tower, A Gay Rights Rally Over Gains and Goals, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2000, at A14 (reporting on the efforts of activists to promote awareness of gay
rights issues and to work toward the advancement of homosexuals in America). Moreover, the
engagement of American citizens in the political process as voters has remained steady, if not
increasing in recent years. See generally Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of
the Vanishing Voter, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963 (2001) (presenting data indicating that the
turnout of eligible voters has fluctuated since the 1970s but has not decreased); see also Juan
Salgado, Letter to the Editor, Voter Registration Increase, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at 38
(celebrating the growing desire of Chicago’s immigrant population to participate in the political
process).
76. HABERMAS, supra note 25, at 382.
77. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 139 (1991) (noting that if Court decisions prove unpopular, elections
may be influenced by the potential for Supreme Court appointments).
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appointed, the public accounts for the Judicial Branch to some extent when
casting its votes for President at the ballot box.78 However, it seems unlikely
that many citizens are overly concerned with judicial appointments in anything
other than the immediate. Thus, if the Judiciary is to have any democratic
function, it must be in the protection of the underlying principles that ensure
democratic vitality in the public sphere. In this way, the role of the Judicial
Branch serves an important democratic principle.
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay
what the law is.”79 The thrust of this oft-quoted statement embodies concepts
central to the role of the Court. First, the Court is the ultimate authority of
constitutional claims, beyond which there is no judicial appeal.80 Thus, the
force of an opinion by the Supreme Court generally determines the course of
constitutional law on a specific issue for years to come.81 Second, the
statement, when considered in light of the Supremacy Clause,82 includes an
implicit and logical assertion that the Court is expounding the law of America.
In other words, the Court determines the state of American law, derived from

78. Id.
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed. 1982) (“That
there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction is a proposition which has not been,
and is not likely to be contested.”).
81. Of course, it is possible that Congress can overturn the Court’s decisions via
constitutional amendments:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. V. Likewise, under certain circumstances, Congress has the power to impeach
and remove Supreme Court Justices. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and
all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). However,
amendments are rare—only four times has Congress amended the Constitution in order to alter a
Supreme Court decision. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 776 (1991). Additionally, Justice Samuel Chase, the only Supreme
Court Justice to have ever been impeached, was neither convicted of any crime nor removed from
office. Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and Constitutional
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 139 (1998).
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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the Constitution and American traditions, and ultimately, the American people,
in the form of statutory law.83
Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this limitation on government and
the Court in 1812 when discerning the limits of American legal power over
other nations:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the
nation as an independent sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation,
within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible
of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty,
to the extent, of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the
same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction. All
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow
from no other legitimate source.
This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less
determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if
84
understood, not less obligatory.

While Chief Justice Marshall was referring to the limits on the exercise of
American power over other nations, the logic of the rule is reciprocal. It is an
illegitimate exercise of government to permit foreign influence over the laws
and practices of the American court system because the exercise of foreign
authority does not arise from popular consent.
Indeed, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Atkins v.
Virginia, it is the legislature that must respond to the will and morality of the
public.85 The Court should, as much as possible, ensure that its decisions do
not “cut off the normal democratic processes.”86 Likewise, Alexander
Hamilton noted the derivation of the Constitution from the American people
and the importance of the preservation of that democratic will in The
Federalist No. 78:
[This conclusion] only supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both [the judicial and legislative powers]; and that where the will of the
legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people

83. The Framers indicated that the Court ought to defer to the will of the people:
It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretence of a repugnancy, may
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. . . . The
courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure
to that of the legislative body.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed. 1982).
84. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
85. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id.
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declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter,
87
rather than the former.

In the interest of ensuring the preservation of the democratic process, the
Court’s role should be confined to determining the law for Americans insofar
as Americans have constructed that law—whether it be from the Framers’
original intent, through constitutional amendment, statutory authority, or
through narrow judicially-created precedent tailored to take American mores
and practices into account. As Justice Scalia warned in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, “We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding.”88
A logical conclusion from this reasoning, therefore, is that when
consensus-based precedents for determining the meaning of the Constitution
are employed, such as in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court must
ensure that its decisions preserve the democratic function of the citizenry to
whatever extent possible. In order to understand how democratic ideals can
best be considered and promoted by the Court, it is important to analyze the
methods from which such interpretations are derived. Part II provides an
overview of the Court’s recent methodology with regard to the Eighth
Amendment.
II. THE DISPUTE OVER FOREIGN LAW IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES
In light of the philosophical and political thought that created and shaped
American democracy, constitutional case law has led and defined the recent
increase in debate over the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.89
Specifically, the Eighth Amendment is directly linked to democratic principles
by the Court’s invocation of a standard that requires an analysis of the state of
social discourse as to what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.”90
Increasingly, the Supreme Court has considered and cited foreign law as a
source of authority in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.91 The following
discussion provides a brief overview of the Court’s Eighth Amendment
standard and the recent increase in the use of foreign decisions in its analysis.
A.

Trop v. Dulles and the “Evolving Standards of Decency”

Trop v. Dulles92 set the standard by which “cruel and unusual punishment”
is examined by the Supreme Court. In Trop, the Court was asked to rule on the

87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 83, at 395–96.
88. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., supra notes 4–5.
90. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
91. See generally infra Part II.
92. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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constitutionality of a section of the Nationality Act of 194093 that imposed loss
of citizenship as punishment for desertion by a soldier during wartime.94
Albert Trop, a soldier stationed in Morocco during World War II, escaped
from a stockade where he had been confined for misconduct.95 Trop was later
apprehended, court-martialed, convicted of desertion, and dishonorably
discharged.96 His conviction also required a revocation of his citizenship
under the Nationality Act.97 In an attempt to retain his citizenship, Trop sued
the U.S. government.98
One question before the Court was whether the revocation of a soldier’s
citizenship for Army desertion constituted cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.99 Writing for a 5-4 majority,
Chief Justice Warren stated that the Eighth Amendment guarantees that a
citizen’s punishment will be governed “by the principle of civilized
treatment”100 and embodies the basic principle that the government must
respect the dignity of persons by punishing criminals according to civilized
standards.101 Ultimately, the Court determined that “The [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”102 Within this framework, the Court held that
the revocation of citizenship for desertion constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.103

93. 54 Stat. 1137, 1168–69 (1940), amended by 58 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(8) (1952)).
(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of the
United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by—
...
(8) deserting the military, air, or naval forces of the United States in time of war, if and
when he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction is
dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the service of such military, air, or naval
forces: Provided, That, notwithstanding loss of nationality or citizenship under the terms
of this chapter or previous laws by reason of desertion committed in time of war,
restoration to active duty with such military, air, or naval forces in time of war or the
reenlistment or induction of such a person in time of war with permission of competent
military, air, or naval authority shall be deemed to have the immediate effect of restoring
such nationality or citizenship heretofore or hereafter so lost . . . .
Id.
94. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 88.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 100.
102. Id. at 101.
103. Id.
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In making this determination, the Court looked to the nature of the
punishment and the nature of the political structure within which human beings
live.104 Interestingly, the Court briefly noted within the actual text of the
opinion that only two other nations in the world imposed denationalization as a
punishment for military desertion.105 It is not clear to what extent the Court
relied upon this fact to determine whether the Nationality Act comported with
the “evolving standards of decency . . . of a maturing society,” although it
appears that it had a “confirmatory role” in the Court’s analysis.106
Nonetheless, the presence of foreign law in Trop is noteworthy in that future
cases mirrored the format.
Interestingly, the dissenting opinion in Trop made no criticism of the
majority’s use of foreign law whatsoever.107 In fact, Justice Frankfurter’s
dissent actually invoked the use of foreign law to support his own position.108
If nothing else, the Court’s use of foreign law in Trop opened the door for its
citation in future opinions. Ultimately, however, the repeated citation of
foreign sources in the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has created an
ongoing disagreement between various Justices on its relevance to
constitutional interpretation.
B.

The Road to Roper v. Simmons

After Trop set the standard by which “cruel and unusual punishment”
would be determined in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court decided a
string of opinions over the next half-century that primarily relied on domestic
law and changes in American society.109 Nonetheless, the Court’s continued
invocation of foreign legal sources as a point of reference for constitutional
interpretation is apparent in these cases.
For instance, in 1977, the Court held in Coker v. Georgia110 that the death
penalty could not be instituted as a punishment for rape because this practice
was proscribed by the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against “cruel and
unusual punishment.”111 There, the Court primarily focused on the
proportionality of the offense to the punishment and the small number of states
that allowed the death penalty for the offense of rape.112 However, the Court

104. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101–03.
105. Id. at 103. These nations were the Philippines and Turkey. Id.
106. Id. at 101.
107. See id. at 114–28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 126.
109. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
110. 433 U.S. 584.
111. Id. at 592.
112. Id. at 593.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

DEPRIVING AMERICA OF EVOLVING ITS OWN STANDARDS OF DECENCY?

873

briefly appealed to foreign law and international opinion in a short footnote,
stating that only three major nations allowed the death penalty for rape.113 In
fact, the Court explicitly stated that international opinion was “not irrelevant”
in determining the civility of the punishment under the Eighth Amendment.114
Likewise, in 1982, the Court limited its use of foreign law to a footnote in
Enmund v. Florida,115 where the Court held that the imposition of felony
murder did not comport with the standards of the Eighth Amendment, absent a
specific finding that the defendant intended to kill.116 Pointing to such nations
as Canada, England, and India, the Court noted that its decision in Enmund
was consistent with the views of the world community.117
Foreign views on Eighth Amendment issues did not resurface in the actual
text of a Supreme Court opinion until 1988 when Thompson v. Oklahoma118
was decided. In Thompson, the Court found that the imposition of the death
penalty against murderers under the age of sixteen was inconsistent with the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”119 Writing for a 5-3 majority,120 Justice Stevens stated that this
holding was “consistent with the views that have been expressed by . . . other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members
of the Western European community.”121 To further support the Court’s
holding, Justice Stevens then listed multiple nations that had either restricted
the use of the death penalty to adults or banned the death penalty entirely.122
For the first time, Thompson also included a short reproach of the
majority’s use of foreign law, albeit only in a footnote.123 In dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that foreign law is an inappropriate tool for determining the
113. Id. at 596 n.10. As in Trop v. Dulles, the dissent in Coker made no objection to the use
of foreign sources. Id. at 604–22 (Burger, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 596 n.10 (majority opinion).
115. 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
116. Id. at 782.
117. Id. at 796 n.22. Yet again, the dissent made no criticism of the majority’s use of foreign
law in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 801–31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
118. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
119. Id. at 821–23.
120. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the opinion. Id. at 815.
121. Id. at 830.
122. Id. at 830–31.
Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom or New
Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales,
where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile
be executed. The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal,
the Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for
exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile
executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union.
Id.
123. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868–69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

874

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:855

meaning of the U.S. Constitution and that domestic law is determinative in
constitutional decisions,
even if that position contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world. We
must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that
we are expounding. . . . [W]here there is not first a settled consensus among
our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices
of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans
124
through the Constitution.

After his dissent in Thompson, Justice Scalia became the most vocal critic
of the use of foreign law in constitutional decision-making.125 This
characteristic became apparent in Stanford v. Kentucky, where Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority in a 5-4 opinion declaring that the execution of sixteenand seventeen-year-old murderers did not violate the Eighth Amendment.126
While Justice Scalia did not attack the use of foreign sources directly in the
actual text of the opinion, in discussing the application of the Trop standard, he
asserted that the Court must look to the conceptions of decency held by
modern American society.127 Nonetheless, his opposition to the use of foreign
materials was again made clear in a footnote:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention of petitioners . . . that the sentencing practices of other
countries are relevant. . . . “[T]he practices of other nations” . . . cannot serve
to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is
128
accepted among our people.

124. Id.
125. Justice Scalia’s view of the issue pertains not only to Eighth Amendment decisions, but
also to any citation of foreign law when interpreting the meaning of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that new
constitutional rights do not suddenly appear in the Constitution simply because foreign countries
have felt differently about the issue and calling the majority’s use of foreign law “meaningless”
and “dangerous”); see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary at the Conference of Supreme Courts of
the Americas (Oct. 1995), in 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1119, 1121 (1996) (arguing that foreign
and international law is to be cited by the Court only where the “customary usages of
international affairs” are involved, and those usages do not contradict American law); Scalia &
Breyer, supra note 6 (where Justice Scalia criticized the use of foreign law as a mechanism for
manipulation whereby judges can impose their personal beliefs on the nation by appealing to
whatever sources agree with them).
126. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
127. Id. at 369.
128. Id. at 369 n.1 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion, despite the fact that he would become one of the most outspoken
advocates of using foreign law after writing the opinions in both Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v.
Simmons. See Toobin, supra note 5 (examining Justice Kennedy’s interest in foreign law and the
backlash he has received for citing it in his opinions).
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While Justice Scalia denounced the use of foreign law, the citation of
which had gone uncontested until Thompson, Justice Brennan’s dissent
attacked the position of the majority on this issue.129 Noting that a number of
previous Eighth Amendment cases looked beyond American borders, the
dissent relayed statistics in support of the assertion that the world community
rejected the use of the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile
offenders.130
The debate became more pronounced in 2002 with Atkins v. Virginia,
where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of the
mentally retarded.131 Once again, the majority confined its use of foreign and
international opinion to a footnote, rather than including it in the text of the
opinion.132 Although conceding that global opinion was not dispositive, the
majority stated that the world’s overwhelming disapproval of imposing the
death penalty on the mentally retarded bolstered support for the Court’s
holding.133
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia wrote dissenting opinions
that attacked the majority’s invocation of international sources.134 The Chief
Justice noted that the Court had denounced the use of these sources in
Stanford, writing: “I fail to see . . . how the views of other countries regarding
the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate
determination. . . . For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we
are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.”135
Justice Scalia reiterated this sentiment, suggesting that the majority had
fabricated a national consensus in part through its use of foreign law.136
“[I]rrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”137
C. The Expansion of Foreign Influence in Roper v. Simmons
Although the use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment decisions started
quietly in Trop, the division on the Court became clearer when Justice
Kennedy invoked foreign legal sources as authority for the majority opinion in
Roper v. Simmons.138 Justice Kennedy’s discussion in Roper represents the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Stanford, 492 U.S at 382–405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 389–90.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 316 n.21.
Id.
Id. at 321–28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 337–54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 324–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 347–48.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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most extensive and pronounced use of foreign sources in the actual text of any
Eighth Amendment decision.
In Roper, the defendant, Christopher Simmons, was seventeen years old
when he and two cohorts planned and committed burglary and a gruesome
murder.139 While planning the crime, Simmons told his friends that they
would be able to get away with the crime due to their age.140 At trial,
Simmons was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.141 On state
collateral appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Simmons that the
Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of a death sentence against a juvenile
murderer.142
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and
affirmed the Missouri decision in Roper v. Simmons.143 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy argued under the Trop rule that the standards of
decency in society had evolved so as to make the implementation of the death
penalty against minors cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.144
While engaging in this process, the Court focused primarily on a perceived
consistent movement among the states away from the use of the juvenile death
penalty.145
However, the Court did not limit its efforts to the practices of the states.
Justice Kennedy specifically set aside a separate discussion in its own section
of the opinion to argue that the unconstitutionality of the juvenile death penalty
was confirmed by “the stark reality that the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.”146 By contrasting the practices and standards of the United States
with that of other countries, the Court found that the “overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . provide[s]
respected and significant confirmation” for the decision that the juvenile death
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.147

139. Id. at 556–57.
140. Id. at 556.
141. Id. at 558.
142. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003). The Missouri Supreme Court
stated that despite the holding in Stanford, a national consensus disapproving of the execution of
juvenile offenders had since developed. Id. at 399. The court also noted that “the views of the
international community have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty for
juveniles.” Id. at 411.
143. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
144. Id. at 564–67.
145. Id. at 564–75.
146. Id. at 575.
147. Id. at 578.
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The Court’s analysis accounted for the fact that only eight nations had
exercised the death penalty against a juvenile since 1990.148 Of these, the
Court emphasized that every nation except the United States had either banned
the death penalty for juveniles or shown disapproval for such executions.149
The Court remarked: “In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands
alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”150
The majority defended its use of foreign law, noting that while global
normative practices and opinions were not dispositive, they did play an
important confirmatory role in the Court’s decision.151
Justice O’Connor dissented in Roper, finding that there was no domestic
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, but agreed that the Court’s use of
foreign materials served a confirmatory role in Eighth Amendment analysis.152
Noting that the Court regularly included references to foreign opinion in
Eighth Amendment decisions, Justice O’Connor wrote:
This inquiry reflects the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as
the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from the maturing values
of civilized society. . . . [T]his Nation’s evolving understanding of human
dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with,
153
the values prevailing in other countries.

Despite her defense of the use of foreign sources, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged that the only role foreign opinion can play in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is a confirmatory one.154
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, provided a scathing dissent criticizing the
Court’s holding and the majority’s reliance on foreign legal sources.155 Noting
that foreign opinion is not binding on the Court, Justice Scalia argued that “the
basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to
the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”156 The
dissent argued that no justification could be found for the inclusion of foreign
law in the reasoned opinion of a constitutional issue.157 Justice Scalia argued

148. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. The nations cited by the Court were: China, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 578. “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of
freedom.” Id.
152. Id. at 604–05 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 604–05.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 607–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 624.
157. Id.
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that this view, similarly expressed in Stanford, Lawrence, and Atkins, remained
valid even in light of Trop.158
Essentially, the dissent viewed the Court’s opinion as disregarding the
reality of the domestic attitude about the juvenile death penalty159 and accused
the majority of casting its members’ own personal views about the juvenile
death penalty into the law by means of foreign legal sources.160
To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it
otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry. . . . What these
foreign sources “affirm,” rather than repudiate, is the Justices’ own notion of
how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in
America. . . . “Acknowledgement” of foreign approval has no place in the legal
opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—
161
which is surely what it parades as today.

Thus, Justice Scalia was not only unconvinced that foreign law should play a
role in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, he was also unimpressed with what
he viewed as the majority’s inclusion of such materials under the guise of a
merely confirmatory role.162
Of course, the portion of Justice Scalia’s statement that guesses at the
motives of his fellow Justices is outside the focus of this Comment. However,
Justice Scalia’s conclusion that foreign law must have played some role in the
decision is certainly relevant here.163 Professor Ernest Young argues
persuasively that the finding of a national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty in Roper was dubious and that the Court included international opinion
as part of the consensus-building pool to make its holding persuasive.164 As a
158. Roper, 543 U.S. at 611–14, 621.
159. Id. at 622. “Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the
Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and their so-called international community
take center stage.” Id.
160. Id. at 628.
161. Id. at 627–28 (emphasis in original).
162. Id.
163. The Roper majority did not deny this point, but instead attempted to marginalize its
importance by referring to its use of foreign sources as merely confirmatory. See Roper, 543 U.S.
at 578 (majority opinion) (“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”).
Though dissenting, Justice O’Connor supported the use of foreign law in a confirmatory role. Id.
at 605 (O’Connor dissenting) (“At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature
can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus. The
instant case presents no such domestic consensus, however, and the recent emergence of an
otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact.”).
164. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148
(2005).
Including foreign practice shifts the question from whether places like Texas and
Missouri—states maintaining the juvenile death penalty—are unusual out of the fifty-one
American jurisdictions, to whether those states are unusual considered against the world
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result, this Comment joins the recognition that the Court did rely on foreign
sources and argues that in its reliance on these sources, the Court’s decision
damaged democratic discourse.
III. THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS
UNDERMINES THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
As one might expect, the dialogue between the Justices in these cases has
fueled the recent explosion of debate regarding the place of foreign law in the
Court’s decisions.165 So far, whenever the Court has invoked foreign opinion
in its reasoning, it has taken time to note that the use of these sources is not
dispositive.166 However, the Court’s language walks a shaky line between
mere “confirmatory” use of foreign laws and actual persuasive value. Thus,
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the use of these sources raises valid concerns,
and Americans have started to pay attention. In keeping with this recent
upsurge of interest in the role of foreign sources, this Comment argues that the
use of foreign sources in Eighth Amendment decisions undermines important
and necessary democratic principles.
As previously noted, whenever the Court makes a determination on a legal
issue, the holding curtails discussion of that issue in the public sphere to some
extent.167 This is much more the case when the Court hands down
constitutional prohibitions. For instance, with the decision to ban the juvenile
death penalty in Roper, the Court effectively removed any substantive
discussion of the juvenile death penalty from the public sphere. Debating and
as a whole (or perhaps some subset of countries with values similar to our own). The
foreign jurisdictions, in other words, swell the denominator against which the set of
jurisdictions retaining the benighted practice is measured.
The point of swelling the denominator is that it is not big enough without these
foreign practices. . . . Such an even split [among Americans] hardly fits the common
understanding of “consensus” as “[g]eneral agreement or concord” or “the collective
unanimous opinion of a number of persons.” This substantial minority position on the
domestic plane becomes an aberrational practice, however, when judged against the
backdrop of world opinion.
Id. at 153–54.
165. See supra notes 5, 6, and 8 and accompanying text.
166. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78 (majority opinion) (calling foreign opinion “not
controlling” but “instructive” authority that provides “respected and significant confirmation”);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (stating that foreign sources “are by no means
dispositive, [but] their consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to our
conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”). But see
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases recognize
that objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other
countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.”).
167. See QUIRK & BRIDWELL, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing Alexander Bickel’s view that
“[t]he Court’s decision necessarily cuts off public debate and the possibility of achieving a
democratic consensus.”).
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exploring the issue among opposing viewpoints is futile because the Court has
determined the policy issue once and for all.
The Court’s decision in Roper is a one-way ratchet—there will be no more
hopeful debates about the truth of the juvenile death penalty because the Court
has already made a final determination. Even if there is a sudden influx of
seventeen-year-old murderers and citizens would prefer to re-impose the death
penalty, the states would be powerless to do so in the face of Roper. In fact,
some states apparently do prefer to allow the death penalty as an option for
minors, as twenty states allowed juvenile executions at the time of Roper.168
However, while disagreement on the issue remains, proponents and opponents
of the ban have little or no incentive to continue discussing the matter in the
public sphere.
With discussion of the merits of retaining the juvenile death penalty
removed from the public sphere, opponents of the ruling have nowhere to take
their position, and engagement of the issue can no longer occur on a significant
level. Most disturbing is the recognition that to the extent that foreign opinion
contributed to this determination, the American public has been deprived of the
ability to better itself with a thoughtful and thorough engagement of the
issue.169
This point may initially seem overblown, but a closer look indicates that
constitutional decisions influenced in whole or in part by foreign legal sources
deprive American society of the possibility of resolving the issue by
developing a real consensus on truth. Even if the juvenile death penalty is just,
society is deprived of the opportunity to arrive at this understanding, thereby
bypassing an important principle embodied in the Judicial Branch itself—a full
and proper understanding of justice. Conversely, even if the juvenile death
penalty is unjust, pre-emption of that discussion hinders social progress by
circumventing American citizens’ recognition of that fact.170 Whereas Mill
and Habermas argue that, over time, an argument should mature in such a way
that the weight of one position so clearly refutes the other that it becomes
accepted, this process cannot occur when the topic is de-thematized.

168. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. The Court noted that the same calculation existed in Atkins v.
Virginia, although the trend towards abolition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded was
substantially more extreme than for the juvenile death penalty. Id.
169. The deprivation of the ability to better ourselves derives from the notion that it is more
beneficial if society actually agrees that the juvenile death penalty is wrong than if the Court bars
the death penalty’s imposition while a large percentage of the population still supports it.
170. Of course, this assumes that the morality of the juvenile death penalty remains an open
question. While convincing arguments can be made that the juvenile death penalty is morally
illegitimate, for the purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to note that the question remains an
open one in American society. At the time of Roper, twenty of thirty-eight states that employed
the death penalty also retained the juvenile death penalty. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
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The Growth and Nature of Foreign Law’s Influence in Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence

One important question is to what extent the Court actually relies on
foreign law in its decisions. The Court has repeatedly asserted that foreign law
merely plays a confirmatory role in its decisions and is not treated as binding
authority.171 However, the recent expansion of the use of these sources
indicates that foreign law may play a greater role than some claim. In Trop,
the discussion was limited to a short paragraph.172 Coker173 and Enmund174
both limited the discussion to footnotes, and Thompson’s discussion of foreign
sources was confined to a brief paragraph.175 Even Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Stanford limited its criticism of foreign opinion as a resource for
constitutional interpretation to a footnote.176
In Roper v. Simmons, however, the Court painstakingly recounted the state
of foreign law on the juvenile death penalty over three pages in a section
separate from the rest of the opinion.177 This considerable expansion appears
indicative of a greater willingness by the Court to use foreign law as a
determinative factor, rather than merely confining it to a confirmatory role as
the Roper majority claimed.178 This appearance is not merely a function of the
length of the Court’s treatment; the discussion in Roper is the most thorough,
considered, and serious examination of foreign law in any Eighth Amendment
case.179
What seems somewhat paradoxical is why the Court cites these sources at
all if they carry no actual weight in its decision. In fact, Justice Scalia raised
this very point in a debate with Justice Breyer in early 2005.180 Showing
concern for what he sees as selective citation of foreign law by certain Justices
only when it agrees with their personal views, Justice Scalia stated:
Do you want it to be authoritative? I doubt whether anybody would say, “Yes,
we want to be governed by the views of foreigners.” Well if you don’t want it

171. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (“The opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.”) (emphasis added).
172. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958).
173. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
174. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
175. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988).
176. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
178. Consistent with this pattern is the considerable length of discussion given to foreign
sources by the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
179. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78.
180. Scalia & Breyer, supra note 6.
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to be authoritative, then what is the criterion for citing it [or] not? That it
181
agrees with you? I don’t know any other criterion to bring forward.

Justice Breyer responded to the criticism by noting that while foreign opinions
are not binding, judges in other nations have dealt with similar questions of
law, and American judges can learn about the U.S. Constitution by reading
their opinions.182 Even so, the actual discussion and citation of foreign law in
the decisions tends to indicate that these sources hold some perceived authority
beyond mere confirmatory or informative value. Thus, while the growing use
of foreign legal sources in Supreme Court decisions does not certainly indicate
that the Court is using foreign law as a determinative factor—after all, the
opinions do provide at least some domestic support for their holdings in all of
these cases—the growing presence of foreign sources does create the
impression that the Court finds them instructive and accords some weight to
them.
Nonetheless, a number of scholars have found the “confirmatory role”
explanation persuasive. For instance, Professor Vicki Jackson argues that
foreign law has played such a role since at least 1879.183 She suggests that in
referencing foreign sources, jurists
do not treat foreign or international material as binding, or as presumptively to
be followed. But neither do they put on blinders that exclude foreign legal
sources and experience. Transnational sources are seen as interlocutors,
offering a way of testing understanding of one’s own traditions and
184
possibilities by examining them in the reflections of others’.

181. Id.
182. Id. Professor Young does not think the decision in Roper reflects Justice Breyer’s
interest in learning from other judges, because the Court simply counted foreign jurisdictions that
barred the juvenile death penalty; the Court did not investigate the rationales behind these
decisions in any foreign jurisdiction. Young, supra note 164, at 152, 155.
The Court might feel strongly based on its own moral reasoning, that the juvenile death
penalty is immoral but be unwilling to override democratic processes unless it finds its
intuitions shared by a large majority of respected legislators and jurists. This majority
does not exist, of course, until the foreign jurisdictions are counted. Foreign practice thus
“persuades” the Court, but it is persuasion of a particular kind. The Court is not
persuaded by new rationales, but rather by the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions take a
particular view. It has not “learned” anything from looking abroad other than to find out
that others agree with what the Court already believed. It is deferring to numbers, not
reasons.
Id. at 155.
183. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement,
119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).
184. Id. at 114.
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According to Professor Jackson, consideration of foreign legal materials in an
“interlocutory framework” merely “prompt[s] deeper reflection on whether
current interpretations live up to our own constitutional commitments.”185
Despite this noble model of comparative constitutional analysis, Professor
Jackson’s view appears to treat this approach as truth-neutral—an analysis that
occurs “without a thumb on the scale in either direction, permitting more
differentiated influences . . . in an interlocutory framework.”186 However,
Professor Jackson fails to note that all relevant information has some
persuasive value, and the examination and use of such information necessarily
do lead toward one direction or another. This is the nature of information
sharing—examination of other possibilities and viewpoints requires one to be
self-critical of one’s own position. This process necessarily involves the
prospect of persuasion. For this reason, the Court’s thorough examination of
foreign law in cases such as Roper appears to include a persuasive component.
When a court engages in a “confirmatory” analysis under the Eighth
Amendment, it essentially asks: “Are we right about this moral judgment?”
The argument made in this Comment is that in doing so courts ask an
unnecessary and inappropriate question. Courts applying the Trop standard
should ask: “What moral judgment has a consensus of Americans reached?”
This is the extent of the constitutional inquiry. A court’s analysis of foreign
law is unnecessary because such an analysis has nothing to do with the national
consensus. It is improper because, by its inquiry into foreign law, a court
abandons its role as an arbiter of the law and becomes an arbiter of morality.
Such judgments should be left up to the democratic process, which is fully
capable of placing moral norms into a legal framework via the Legislative and
Executive Branches. The next section explains how the inclusion of foreign
legal materials as persuasive authority in constitutional law prevents robust
democratic development.
B.

The Use of Foreign Law as a Mechanism to Circumvent the Democratic
Process

As it is the role of judges is to ensure that the laws of the United States
comply with the Constitution, it is logical to conclude that constitutional
decisions are domestic concerns with legal implications for the citizens of the
United States, who are granted rights by that document. As exemplified by the
line of Eighth Amendment cases discussed above, the Court’s ability to define

185. Id. at 127; see also Yitzchok Segal, Comment, The Death Penalty and the Debate Over
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citation of Foreign and International Law, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1421, 1432, 1442 (2006) (arguing that foreign law’s “confirmatory role” is evident because while
case law has held national consensus to trump contrary foreign opinion, the inverse is not true:
“[C]ontrary comparative legal materials cannot trump the national consensus.”).
186. Jackson, supra note 183, at 124.
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and give meaning to terms within the Constitution is one of great importance
for American liberty and self-governance. Therefore, when the Supreme Court
considers whether an American law comports to the United States
Constitution, the principles considered logically should be American in
nature.187 As Justice Scalia explained:
[W]e judges of the American democracies are servants of our peoples, sworn
to apply, without fear or favor, the laws that those peoples deem appropriate.
We are not some international priesthood empowered to impose upon our free
and independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own. If
“international norms” had controlled our forefathers, democracy would never
188
have been born here in the Americas.

In light of this principle, it is difficult to see any logical relationship between
American constitutional law and the views of other nations, specifically as they
pertain to Eighth Amendment considerations.189
Moreover, as explained by Mill, Habermas, and a host of others, social
norms and political ideologies that drive policy determinations develop within
public opinion over time.190 This process occurs via discussion, consideration,
and ultimately, acceptance of the best argument available in the “marketplace
of ideas.”191 The interaction of individuals within the public sphere facilitates
the accommodation of new ideas via the thematization of topics, followed by
give-and-take discussion and continued growth of conflicting positions until
the strength of an argument prevails and is deemed accepted as truth within
that society.192

187. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are
expounding.”).
188. Scalia, supra note 125, at 1122.
189. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the citation to foreign law creates other problems
for self-governance:
[J]udges of course are not accountable to the people, but we are appointed through a
process that allows for participation of the electorate, the President who nominates judges
is obviously accountable to the people. The Senators who confirm judges are accountable
to the people. In that way the role of the judge is consistent with the democratic theory.
If we’re relying on a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means,
no President accountable to the people appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to
the people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role in shaping a law that binds the
people in this country.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–01 (2005) (testimony of
John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice of the United States).
190. See supra Part I.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Judicial use of foreign law does not necessarily prevent this process
outright. However, if foreign law plays a persuasive role in constitutional
determination, its use pre-empts at least part of an important discussion that
should take place within this country. To be sure, Court decisions always preempt public discussion of the issues they address to some extent.193 Generally
pre-emption is a non-issue as citizens expect the “truth” of the Constitution’s
meaning to be discerned by the Court in a manner that does not involve any
appeal to the public sphere.194
The difference with the Eighth Amendment is that it is consensus-based.195
As such, the Trop standard directly gives import to the state of the present
discussion of an Eighth Amendment issue in the public sphere.196 The Court’s
attention to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society”197 requires an examination of the debate as it has been
resolved in the states.198 To the extent that the discourse has achieved
consensus in any one state, the Court can certainly further the democratic
process by giving weight to that determination. Additionally, the Court should
give weight to the fact that in some states, the discussion continues and may
have some distance to cross before something resembling consensus is
reached. When the Court relies upon these mechanisms for gauging the
progress of American society, democracy is not circumvented.
However, the ongoing democratic process in those places where consensus
has yet to occur is severely disrupted if the Court inserts the views of foreign
nations—some of which may not have “evolved” via democratic inclusive
discourse. If the Court uses foreign opinion as a persuasive factor in the
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the judiciary runs the risk of
supplanting the development of ideas in the public sphere with the views of the
world community. While such a view is certainly appealing to opponents of
the death penalty when focused on the end result, it undermines the democratic
principles that have nourished American society for over two centuries.
The democratic process is best served when the discussion results in
political action at the state level, where a consensus can be formed and
implemented through the election of officials who will examine the will of the
people and enact laws in the legislature that comport with their will. Until this
occurs, it is in the best interests of democracy for the Court to stand aside, at

193. See QUIRK & BRIDWELL, supra note 14, at 8.
194. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
195. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78, 564 (2005) (applying the Trop standard
and noting that “[t]he beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus”).
196. See id.
197. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
198. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (requiring a review for consensus “as expressed in particular
by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”).
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least as regards the Eighth Amendment, so that the public may cultivate the
dialogue and arrive at a collective agreement.199
Proponents of foreign sources ignore the possibility that international law
and opinion may be better utilized in the public sphere than in the courtroom.
There is no reason that foreign practices cannot provoke reflection on our
constitutional traditions in the political process. If foreign approaches to law
and morality are truly persuasive, the democratic political process is wellequipped to assess them as such and integrate them into statutory or
constitutional law.200
Finally, in that the Eighth Amendment Trop standard is concerned with the
growth of society,201 it is more beneficial to the evolution of these standards if
the populace is allowed to engage in discussion and reach an agreement on the
issue before outlawing it. As the death penalty goes, if we are to determine as
a society that its imposition is unjust, then it is better that there be a collective
decision not to execute the offenders than to allow a panel of judges to tie the
hands of the executioner in avoidance of the social discussion. If this model is
followed with regard to the Eighth Amendment, the Court will not interfere
with the potential for social progress, and the public will have real potential to
improve itself overall.
C. Possible Responses to Curb the Use of Foreign Legal Sources
In light of the conclusion that the use of foreign law creates undesirable
results, not the least of which is to curb democratic debate on a variety of
controversial and important social issues, it is important to consider ways in
which the tendency to appeal to foreign sources might be limited or eliminated
altogether.

199. Unfortunately, the Court did not take this approach in Roper. As Professor Young notes,
[I]n Roper . . . [t]he national political branches had not, in fact, sat passively by as the rest
of the world staked out positions on the juvenile death penalty. The Court, however, gave
these political branch decisions the back of the hand. . . . The national political branches
had plainly determined that the world’s condemnation should not affect our own domestic
law. But the Court adopted precisely the opposite course.
Young, supra note 164, at 164–65.
200. Whether the persuasive value of foreign opinion is better suited for consideration by the
judiciary or the public may depend on the extent to which one trusts the citizenry’s competence to
consider complex issues, comprehend them, and take effective action through the political
process. Those who distrust the ability of the public to intellectualize political, moral, and legal
principles may prefer to leave such decisions to a more “sophisticated” judiciary. Justice Scalia
argues against this cynicism: “We are not some international priesthood empowered to impose
upon our free and independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own.” Scalia,
supra note 125, at 1122.
201. See supra Parts II.A., II.C.
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Congressional Action

A number of attempts have been made in Congress during recent years to
discourage federal judges and Supreme Court Justices in particular from
utilizing foreign law in their decisions.202 These attempts include everything
from prohibiting the use of foreign sources in constitutional decisions
altogether203 to simply recommending that such sources not be used.204 While
the commitment of members of Congress to maintaining the integrity of
constitutional jurisprudence is admirable, a congressional mandate on how the
Supreme Court should decide cases would be an overextension of
congressional power.205
In order for each branch of government to be effective within the system of
“checks and balances,” Congress should not restrain the Court’s ability to
make judicial determinations as it sees fit.206 If Congress could mandate how

202. See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (indicating a non-binding preference among
members of the House of Representatives that foreign sources not be used to inform the meaning
of the Constitution); S. Res. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004) (prohibiting the citation of foreign sources
and allowing impeachment for breach of good behavior if such citations occur); H.R. Res. 3799,
108th Cong. (2004) (same); H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003) (recommending that Justices not
cite to foreign sources); H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003) (same, but singling out Justices
Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg as favoring the citation of foreign law).
203. H.R. Res. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004).
204. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
205. Congressional power to interfere with the Court’s activities is not thoroughly addressed
in the Constitution. However, the lack of discussion in the text does suggest that such authority is
limited to circumscribing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. In other words, the Constitution gives Congress the power to determine
what cases the Court can hear, but does not give the power to direct how the Court can decide
those cases. In United States v. Klein, the Court declared invalid a statute that required the Court
to dismiss claims where the loyalty of the claimant depended upon presidential pardons. 80 U.S.
128 (1871). The Court reasoned that congressional action infringed upon the judicial power:
Can we [dismiss such cases] without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it? We
think not . . . . Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative
from the judicial power.
Id. at 146–47.
206. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174–80 (1803); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 261
(James Madison) (Bantam ed. 1982) (“To what expedient then shall we finally resort for
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid
down in the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior
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the Court should rule on a particular issue, the Court’s role as an arbiter of the
law would be greatly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.207
Thus, as well-meaning as Congress may be in its attempts to pass laws and
resolutions about the methodology of judicial interpretation, such actions
would inadvertently circumvent the judiciary’s constitutional function as a
check on the legislature.208 Such methods ought not be employed where they
lead to results that threaten the purpose of the Judicial Branch.209
2.

Action by the Executive

Another possible mechanism for the limitation of the use of foreign legal
sources by the judiciary is through the executive’s appointment of Justices who
will refrain from appealing to foreign documents. However, executive action
can likely only have limited success, as Supreme Court appointments are
relatively rare and vacancies come at uncertain times.210 Moreover, a

structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be
the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”).
207. Another issue that has been raised by Congress is whether the citation to foreign law is a
violation of a Justice’s oath and good behavior, warranting removal from the bench. See U.S.
CONST. art III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
292–93 (2005) (questions of Sen. Tom Coburn, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating that he
believed citation to foreign law to be a violation of the oath taken by Justices, which does not
constitute good behavior). Chief Justice Roberts stated in his confirmation hearing that he did not
believe the citation of foreign law constituted a breach of the oath:
I don’t think [the citation of foreign law is] a good approach. I wouldn’t accuse judges or
Justices who disagree with that, though, of violating their oath. I’d accuse them of getting
it wrong on that point, and I’d hope to sit down with them and debate it and reason about
it. I think that Justices who reach a contrary result on those questions are operating in
good faith and trying, as I do on the court I am on now, to live up to that oath that you
read.
Id. at 293 (testimony of John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice of the United States).
208. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75 (positing that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress
the power to facilitate the judiciary’s powers, but intrinsically limits Congress’s authority in that
the Clause does not allow the Legislature to interfere with or subvert judicial independence);
Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2001) (arguing from an originalist point of view that the Constitution
does not allow Congress to dictate how the Court decides cases); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s
First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998) (reading Klein as denying
Congress the ability to require the Court to act against its best judgment in the judicial process).
209. “It is equally evident, that [no branch of government] ought to possess directly or
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective
powers.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (James Madison) (Bantam ed. 1982).
210. Consider the vacancy left in 2005 by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death, coupled with
Justice O’Connor’s retirement.
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prospective Justice’s stance on foreign law is only one jurisprudential issue
that should be considered when making appointments. Ultimately, the use of
foreign law is only one issue in a broad array of other issues, and its import in
the appointment process is only part of the equation.
Another problem with seeking reform through the executive is that as
human beings, judges are not entirely predictable.211 Therefore, even if the
executive expects to appoint a certain “type” of judge, the President cannot be
expected to forecast how a particular judge will rule over time and in what
manner the methodology of a judge might change. Thus, reliance on the
executive to ensure that foreign opinion plays no role in constitutional
decisions is an ineffective remedy.
3.

Criticism in the Public Sphere

A possible way for the public to participate in the eradication of foreign
law from Supreme Court opinions is at the ballot box.212 In other words, when
voting for a presidential candidate, voters can consider the type of judge that
candidate might appoint to the Supreme Court.213 Votes can then be cast for
candidates most likely to appoint judges who would refrain from citing foreign
sources. But while the populace ought to consider a candidate’s potential
appointments to the Supreme Court, there are a plethora of other issues that
must also be accounted for, and the people cannot be expected to ignore all
other issues for the sake of the judiciary’s use of foreign law. Additionally, the
intent behind such an approach would appear results-oriented and politically
motivated rather than methodologically focused. To that extent, judicial

211. See Linda P. Campbell, Justice White: The Democrat Who Often Votes with Court
Conservatives, CHI. TRIB., March 21, 1993, at C18 (examining Justice White’s tendency to vote
with Court conservatives, though he was expected to be judicially liberal); Edward Lazarus,
Boomerang Justices—Ouch!, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at M1 (providing a summary of judges
who have not voted on the Court as their nominating Presidents expected); Todd S. Purdum, A
Justice Not Like the Others, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A24 (noting that Justice White “often
emerged as a conservative force” even though he was appointed by a Democratic president);
David G. Savage & Richard B. Schmitt, Who May Succeed Rehnquist, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
2005, at A1 (stating that although Justice Souter was expected to be judicially conservative, he
has “voted regularly with the [C]ourt’s liberal bloc.”); Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent: The
Fight Over the President’s Judicial Nominations, NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 42 (noting
disappointment by Republicans when “[Justice] Souter turned out to be a moderate-to-liberal
Justice” rather than the conservative jurist they had expected).
212. Indeed, considerations pertaining to the viewpoints of potential appointees to the federal
bench already exist in regard to another controversial issue: abortion. See Jan Crawford
Greenburg & Naftali Bendavid, Rehnquist Illness Puts High Court in Spotlight, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
26, 2004, at 1 (discussing the likely importance of Supreme Court appointments to voters
concerned with abortion).
213. Id.
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criticism at the ballot box may not be especially beneficial to the legal
institution.
However, the public can effectively oppose the use of foreign citations in
another way. Following the notion presented above that debate in the
“marketplace of ideas” results in reaching truth on an issue,214 an effective
mechanism for removing foreign law from constitutional decisions is via
public discourse. In fact, this has already gone on through the thematization of
the issue discussed in newspapers, this Comment, and others like it.215
Continued examination of the use of various sources in the Court’s opinions
over time should lead to pointed arguments on both sides, ultimately resulting
in the acceptance of one view by a vast majority of scholars and concerned
citizens. Thus, a consensus on the issue may be reached so that society at large
favors a methodology that refuses to give weight to foreign opinion when
interpreting the United States Constitution.
As long as a real discussion of methodology and theoretical constitutional
law can occur in the public sphere, citizens will elucidate and expound upon
important insights on the role of foreign law.216 In the process, a general
agreement should be reached over time so that the issue of reliance on foreign
sources in constitutional decisions can resolve itself. As judges are selected
from this populace, the result of the discussion would ideally result in the
appointment of Justices who will not incorporate foreign views into the Court’s
decisions because they, like the public at large, believe that it undermines core
democratic principles. Indeed, if democratic discourse is able to resolve issues
in the manner suggested above, such a process may be successful in combating
the problem.
4.

Judicial Criticism and Ongoing Academic Discussion

Because it could take a long time for the public to reach a consensus,
perhaps the best people to lead the discussion in the immediate are those whom
the question of methodology most directly impacts; the judges themselves. In
fact, this process is already taking place in dissenting opinions and other
commentary produced by judges.217 A vibrant discussion in the judicial sphere
might very well yield results among current judges similar to what can be
expected later in the public sphere. Indeed, results here might be more
pronounced because the quality of discourse and the persuasiveness of the

214. Supra Part I.
215. See supra notes 5, 6, and 8.
216. See supra Part I.
217. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (including debate between majority
and dissent over the role of foreign law; discussed supra Part II.C.); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (including a similar debate to that in Roper); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(same; discussed supra Part II.B.).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

DEPRIVING AMERICA OF EVOLVING ITS OWN STANDARDS OF DECENCY?

891

arguments are likely to improve more rapidly when the issue is undertaken by
scholars and experts on constitutional interpretation.
In addition to the Court’s opinions, American judges have already engaged
in the debate over foreign law in recent years in speeches and law journal
articles.218 As noted above, Justices Scalia and Breyer participated in a debate
at American University over the role of foreign law.219 Additionally, Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and O’Connor have given speeches at the American Society
of International Law supporting the use of foreign sources in Supreme Court
opinions and advocating continued exploration of the issue.220 Taking a
moderate approach, Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals recently spoke in London and noted that while foreign legal sources
may have beneficial effects in American jurisprudence, courts should take “a
cautious approach to comparative constitutionalism.”221
Outside the Supreme Court, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has been
one of the most outspoken critics of the use of foreign law in domestic
constitutional decisions.222 In particular, Judge Posner has noted that citing
foreign law involves various risks, including allowing the political stances of
judges to inadvertently creep into opinions, undermining democratic notions of
218. See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003) (supporting
consideration of foreign law in constitutional jurisprudence, and noting five ways that
consideration of such sources has had a “growing impact on [his] professional life”); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 31–Apr. 2, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
351 (2005) (supporting the growth of comparative analysis in constitutional law); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of A Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329 (finding great value in judicial
consideration of international law: “We are the losers if we do not both share our experience with,
and learn from others.”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348
(2002) (noting the benefit comparative legal analysis can have in American jurisprudence);
O’Scannlain, supra note 8 (providing cautious support for the use of foreign law in American
jurisprudence); Posner, supra note 8 (disapproving of recent uses of foreign law in Supreme
Court decisions); Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2004), in
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004) (arguing that while foreign legal sources may be
instructive in certain rare cases, foreign law is never relevant to interpreting the meaning of the
Constitution); Scalia & Breyer, supra note 6 (debating the merits of relying on foreign law in
constitutional decisions); see also Robert H. Bork, Travesty Time Again, NAT’L REV., March 28,
2005, at 17–18 (criticizing the use of foreign and international opinion in Roper as a “dazzling
combination of lawlessness and moral presumption”).
219. Scalia & Breyer, supra note 6.
220. Breyer, supra note 218; Ginsburg, supra note 218; O’Connor, supra note 218.
221. O’Scannlain, supra note 8, at 1907–08.
222. Posner, supra note 8.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

892

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:855

self-governance, and incorporating authorities into American law without a
thorough understanding of the legal structures where foreign legal opinions are
produced.223 Likewise, former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork has
criticized the Court’s use of foreign law as a move toward allowing
international opinion to mold the Constitution.224 Additionally, legal scholars
have grappled with the debate in recent years, with much disagreement about
the proper role of foreign law, if any, in constitutional decision-making.225
The increasing amount of literature from scholars and judges alike is
promising in that it suggests an ongoing discussion of the issue is taking place
whereby the issue might be resolved in the nature of Habermas’s notion of
democratic truth-finding. The quality of the debate among jurists and scholars
can only be a positive force in the gradual resolution of this issue in American
jurisprudence. It is to this body of legal scholarship that this Comment humbly
attempts a contribution.
CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court’s decisions are integral to the preservation of
American liberty, it is important to examine the tools used by the Court to
ensure that those tools do not hinder American democracy. If nothing else,
when dealing with consensus-based precedents, such as that in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, it is important that the Court incorporates
democratic ideals into its consideration. Looking to foreign opinion for a
determination of what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” oversteps
that boundary. If this trend continues, it may lead to an atmosphere where
convincing a majority of one’s fellow citizens is no longer the way to achieve
social change; instead one may only need to convince five Supreme Court
Justices that the rest of the world has provided an answer.
But no matter how we, the public, decide to approach the issue, the goal
must be a more robust democratic conversation. Perhaps, then, all four of the
above-mentioned approaches have a place in the gradual determination of what

223. Id. at 84–90.
224. Bork, supra note 218, at 17–18.
225. See Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”:
Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1298–1327 (arguing that the use of foreign
law might be relevant for purposes of predicting whether a new rule of law will be effective, or
explaining differences between legal systems, but not for the purpose of determining moral facts
relevant to the Constitution); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652
(2005) (suggesting in part that the American Constitution is unavoidably influenced by foreign
law because there is overlap and reciprocity in various legal systems); McGinnis, supra note 8
(arguing that foreign law allows judges to place their personal views in their decisions,
undermines principles of self-governance, and reduces the diversity of political approaches in the
world).
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role foreign law has in American domestic constitutional decisions, if any.
Even in the legislature’s overtures against the use of foreign law and attempted
mandates, a communication occurs with the public. In this way issues are
thematized and thrown into the realm of public discourse for closer
examination.
There is little doubt that when Senators Tom Coburn and Jon Kyl recently
commented on Chief Justice Roberts’s views on the use of foreign law at his
confirmation hearings that they were communicating to both the Court and
their constituents their own personal views as well.226 Open and conscientious
discussion on any issue is good for American society.227 However, while the
citation of foreign sources seems to run contrary to democratic principles, it is
important that the discussion of their use not be prematurely interrupted. After
all, one can hardly claim to support discourse as a method of truth-finding
while simultaneously imposing a prohibition on others before a meaningful
consensus is reached. It is this author’s hope that when the issue is ultimately
resolved, democratic principles will prevail and the use of foreign law as a
basis for Eighth Amendment decision-making will become a thing of the past.
DAVID J. PFEFFER

226. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 292–93 (2005)
(questions of Sen. Tom Coburn, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating that he believed
citation to foreign law to be a violation of the oath taken by Justices and a breach of good
behavior); Id. at 199–200 (questions of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating
that he believed citation to foreign law had no place in domestic constitutional decisions).
227. See supra Part I.
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